



Taking the Right Steps Toward Defense Reform
Bruce Klingner
•	 South Korea’s planned extensive defense 
reforms to improve its capabilities against a 
daunting spectrum of security threats from 
North Korea are commendable and will 
redress many of the ROK’s security short-
comings.
•	 While the reform plan will improve South 
Korea’s ability to prevail in a major war 
against North Korea, additional measures 
are necessary to respond effectively to 
Pyongyang’s tactical provocations.
•	 Despite these efforts, South Korea will remain 
reliant on the U.S. to maintain peace and 
stability throughout East Asia. Washington 
must maintain a robust forward-deployed 
military presence in East Asia.
•	 Congress must fully fund ongoing U.S. mili-
tary realignment plans in South Korea and 
Japan and reject additional cuts in the 
defense budget that would have a devastat-
ing impact on U.S. ability to deter security 
threats in Asia, protect American national 
interests, and fulfill our defense treaty obli-
gations to critical allies in the region
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Abstract: South Korea has initiated a series of extraor-
dinary defense reforms. These reforms are commendable 
and will redress many of South Korea’s security shortcom-
ings. Seoul will be hampered in these efforts, however, by 
demographic and fiscal constraints. Yet such barriers must 
be overcome; an increasingly unstable North Korea and 
an expansive, belligerent China demand as much. Fur-
thermore, if Seoul is ever to “go global” with its political, 
economic, and military capabilities, the transformations 
outlined by the DR 307 reform plan must be enacted—
and the U.S. can help.
From a full-scale invasion by the million-man 
North Korean army to tactical-level clashes along the 
inter-Korean border, South Korea is facing a daunt-
ing spectrum of security threats from North Korea. 
Even North Korea’s weaknesses pose a challenge to 
Seoul, as regime collapse would trigger instability, 
massive refugee flows, humanitarian disaster, Chinese 
incursion into North Korea, loss of control of nuclear 
weapons, and civil war.
For decades, Seoul has countered these threats by 
developing a military capable of deterring, defend-
ing against, and defeating the North Korean menace. 
These precautions may no longer be sufficient, how-
ever, as South Korea must now respond to growing 
regional as well as global instability. For example, 
Seoul is increasingly concerned about Chinese mili-
tary modernization and the belligerence of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) throughout East Asia.
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In response to these new challenges, as well as 
several domestic concerns, South Korea has initiated 
a series of defense reforms—even as Seoul prepares 
to assume the additional responsibility of wartime 
operational control (OPCON) in 20151—to enable 
its military to protect the country more effective-
ly while expanding its security reach beyond the 
Korean Peninsula. These reforms are commend-
able and will redress many of South Korea’s security 
shortcomings.
Regrettably, Seoul will be hampered in these 
efforts by demographic and fiscal constraints. 
Indeed, questions remain as to whether the govern-
ment will fully fund South Korea’s defense needs; 
defense budget shortfalls have delayed previous 
reform efforts.
South Korea does not bear its security burden 
alone, however, and its alliance with the United 
States will continue to play an irreplaceable role 
in maintaining peace and stability throughout East 
Asia. Despite its security reform initiatives, South 
Korea will remain heavily reliant on U.S. military 
capabilities. Washington should therefore support 
Seoul’s defense reform initiatives while continu-
ing to ensure South Korea’s security through U.S. 
military deployments and the extended deterrence 
guarantee.2
Seoul’s Initial Defense Reform:  
DRP 2020
In 2005, South Korea initiated Defense Reform 
Plan 2020 (DRP 2020), a comprehensive defense 
reform strategy. The goal of this strategy was clear: 
Transform the South Korean military into a smaller 
but more capable force. Overall South Korean mili-
tary manpower would be reduced approximately 25 
percent from 681,000 to 500,000. The army would 
face the largest cuts, disbanding four corps and 23 
divisions and cutting troops from 560,000 in 2004 
to 370,000 in 2020.
Seoul planned to compensate for decreased 
troop levels by procuring advanced fighter and sur-
veillance aircraft, naval platforms, and ground com-
bat vehicles. DRP 2020 called for “replacing nearly 
every outdated major weapon” and “transition[ing] 
to a more professional force with a smaller fraction 
of draftees.”3
The Ministry of Defense characterized this 
approach as a response to the changing strategic 
environment and evolving technological require-
ments. However, South Korea’s demographic woes 
also helped to drive the DRP. From 1977 to 2002, 
South Korea “had more than 400,000 young men 
turn draft age almost every year. But in 2009, only 
about 325,000 young men turned draft age, and by 
2023 that number will be less than 250,000.” Presi-
dent Roh Moo-hyun compounded the demographic 
problem by lowering the conscription period from 
26 months to 18 months, further reducing both the 
number of available conscripts and the experience 
level of soldiers.4
The 2005 defense reform was also influenced by 
ideological concerns, such as President Roh’s desire 
to create a less militarized South Korean society. 
Reducing both conscript levels and the length of 
1. Wartime OPCON Transition will shift from a command system centered on the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command 
to a new combined defense system led by the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and supported by a to-be-created 
U.S. Korea Command. In 2006, President Roh Moo-hyun requested that the U.S. return wartime operational control 
(OPCON) of ROK forces. In 2007, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to OPCON transfer in April 2012. The transfer was 
subsequently postponed until 2015.
2. During the 42nd U.S.–South Korean Security Consultative Meeting in October 2010, the two sides agreed that the U.S. 
commitment to provide extended deterrence included “the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.” United States and Republic of Korea, “Joint Communiqué: 
The 42nd U.S.–ROK Security Consultative Meeting,” October 8, 2010, at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20101008usrok.pdf 
(October 17, 2011).
3. Bruce W. Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan,” RAND Corporation Occasional Paper 
No. OP-165-OSD, December 2005, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf 
(October 12, 2011).
4. Bruce W. Bennett, “Managing Catastrophic North Korea Risks,” The Korea Herald, January 21, 2010.
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military service was politically beneficial for Roh: It 
placated the youth vote and provided South Korea’s 
civilian economy with a much needed increase in 
manpower. However, it left the military with a lack 
of experienced soldiers.
This decision was also consistent with Roh’s 
more benevolent North Korean threat assessment 
and his vision for transforming Seoul’s relationship 
with both Pyongyang and Washington. Specifically, 
Roh believed that he could improve relations with 
North Korea by both continuing to provide uncon-
ditional largesse to Pyongyang and reducing South 
Korea’s military. He presumed that North Korea 
would follow suit by reducing its own military and 
moderating its aggressive behavior. Instead, Pyong-
yang maintained its conventional military forces 
and augmented its asymmetric force capabilities.
With regard to Washington, President Roh advo-
cated a South Korea that was capable of operating 
with greater independence from the United States—
a position Roh characterized as a means of restor-
ing South Korean sovereignty. Roh’s DRP 2020 did 
not consider South Korean military requirements 
resulting from attaining wartime OPCON since the 
bilateral decision to do so was not made until 2006.
2009 Revisions in Defense Reform Plan. In 
June 2009, the Ministry of Defense revised DRP 
2020 to address growing defense budget short-
falls as well as to accommodate input from the new 
Lee Myung-bak administration. The most notable 
changes included:
•	 Delaying the DRP 2020 endpoint to 2025;
•	 Reducing the planned defense budget increase; 
and
•	 Adjusting the planned 2020 troop level to 
517,000 (compared to the DRP 2020 goal of 
500,000, down from the 2004 level of 655,000 
troops).
The 2009 defense budget also placed a greater 
emphasis on improving South Korea’s independent 
capabilities against North Korean nuclear and mis-
sile attacks. For instance, the revised defense plan 
would create the Network Centric Warfare system 
to enhance real-time command, control, commu-
nications, computer, intelligence, reconnaissance, 
and surveillance (C4ISR) and long-range, preci-
sion-strike attack capabilities.5 South Korea had 
lacked sufficient “advanced aircraft, munitions, and 
advanced capabilities to strike—with precision—
targets in North Korea. South Korea has relied on 
U.S. capabilities to do much of that for many years, 
but now it is the time for Korea to have that kind of 
capability on its own.”6
Budget Shortfalls Undercut Defense Reform. 
DRP 2020 was premised on the supposition that 
South Korea could compensate for a reduction in 
its military forces with improved technological sys-
tems. Yet, from the very beginning of the plan, the 
government failed to devote sufficient resources to 
developing these new systems—a predictable devel-
opment, given South Korea’s economic struggles at 
the time.
DRP 2020 required a cumulative 15-year bud-
get of 621 trillion won (approximately $505 billion) 
and presumed a 9.9 percent annual military budget 
increase for 2006 through 2010. By 2009, the DRP 
2020 plan already had a 22 trillion won shortfall, 
causing the Ministry of Defense to admit that South 
Korea was unable “even [to] achieve the initial goals 
in the defense reform.”7
The Ministry of Strategy and Finance’s 2010 mil-
itary budget revision increased the 15-year short-
fall to 42 trillion won. If planned defense budget 
5. Paek Jae-ok, “Analysis of the ROK Defense Budget for 2010,” Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, ROK Angle: Korea’s 
Defense Policy, Issue 21, January 26, 2010, at www.kida.re.kr/eng/pcrm/newsletter/download.asp?newsletter=221 (October 12, 
2011); Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2008 Defense White Paper, July 3, 2009,  
at http://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_file/info/mndpaper/e2008_all.pdf (October 12, 2011).
6. Transcript, “Conversation with Dr. Bruce Bennett and Dr. Kim Taewoo,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, April 19, 2011, 
at http://www.asaninst.org/upload_eng/board_files/file1_278.pdf (October 12, 2011).
7. Jung Sung-ki, “Defense Reform Faces Overhaul,” Korea Times, August 27, 2008,  
at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/04/116_30141.html (October 12, 2011).
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shortfalls continue, the gap will be 110 trillion won, 
almost four times the 2009 Ministry of Defense 
budget.8 As a result, the 2009 plan called for cutting 
military forces by 180,000 troops before acquisition 
of modern programs could offset the reduction in 
forces—a development that increased South Korea’s 
military risk and vulnerability. Indeed, neither the 
original nor revised DRP 2020 included sufficient 
measures to meet South Korean requirements for 
assuming wartime OPCON, including necessary 
command structure changes.9
Revising the Direction of  
Defense Reform: DR 307
On March 8, 2011, South Korean Defense Min-
ister Kim Kwan-jin announced 73 short-, mid-, and 
long-term military reform objectives of the new DR 
307 plan to be implemented during 2011 to 2030.10 
The plan derives its name from the date—March 7, 
or 3/07—on which it was approved by President 
Lee Myung-bak.11 Kim stated that the plan’s main 
priorities were “strengthening cohesion of the armed 
forces, obtaining active deterrence capabilities, and 
beefing up efficiency.” He commented that ROK 
forces had become bulky and inefficient during the 
past 20 years, degrading their ability to respond to 
North Korean provocations.
Catalysts for Change. Some observers have 
perceived DR 307 as a replacement for DRP 2020. 
Others, however, view the plan solely as a response 
to North Korea’s military attacks in 2010.12 Neither 
characterization is entirely correct. The military 
attacks were a catalyst for an extensive review of 
existing defense reform plans. DR 307 is a product 
of that review—a modification superimposed atop 
DRP 2020—rather than a new program.
Even before Pyongyang’s attack on the Cheonan 
and Yeonpyeong Island, President Lee Myung-bak 
had considered making changes to address defi-
ciencies in the existing plan—most notably the 
underfunded defense budget. North Korean aggres-
sion was not the sole reason DR 307 was created, 
and preparations for regaining wartime OPCON, 
as well as demographic factors limiting the pool of 
future conscripts, will therefore continue to influ-
ence South Korean defense reform.
In the aftermath of the 2010 attacks, South Kore-
an public opinion shifted against Pyongyang; the 
populace now feels directly threatened by its neigh-
bor to the north. As a U.S. defense official com-
mented, “the Cheonan attack changed how South 
Koreans thought of themselves; the attack on Yeon-
pyeong changed how South Koreans thought of 
North Korea.”13 This societal shift led to a realign-
ment of security priorities and a commensurate 
increase in support for ensuring sufficient military 
capabilities—though not necessarily support for 
dramatically increasing defense expenditures.
In addition to altering South Korean public opin-
ion toward North Korea, Pyongyang’s two unpro-
voked acts of war sparked a shift in South Korean 
defense planning. Seoul interpreted the attack on 
the Cheonan as an indication of Pyongyang’s growing 
8. Bennett, “Managing Catastrophic North Korea Risks.”
9. Bruce Bechtol, “The U.S. and South Korea: Prospects for Transformation, Combined Forces Operations, and Wartime 
Operational Control: Problems and Remedies,” International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2009), 
pp. 71–96.
10. Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, “Defense Ministry Unveils Defense Reform,” March 9, 2011,  
at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng_2009/WhatsNew/RecentNews (October 12, 2011); KBS World, “Defense Reform Plan 307,” 
March 9, 2011, at http://rki.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_issue_detail.htm?lang=e&current_page=4&No=21105 (October 12, 
2011).
11. When approved by the National Assembly, the plan will be renamed Defense Reform 11-30, indicating that it covers 
the years 2011 to 2030. Some in the South Korean defense establishment already refer to it by this name. For ease of 
readership, the plan is referred to as DR 307 throughout this paper.
12. In March 2010, a North Korean submarine sank the South Korean naval corvette Cheonan in South Korean territorial 
waters, killing 46 sailors. In November 2010, North Korean artillery shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing two 
civilians and two Marines.
13. Author interview with U.S. defense official, April 2011.
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asymmetric warfare capabilities; the artillery shell-
ing of Yeonpyeong Island underscored that North 
Korea’s conventional forces could not be ignored.
Deficiencies in the ROK military’s response to 
the North Korean attacks demonstrated the need to 
expand and accelerate ongoing efforts to improve 
South Korean joint operational capabilities. The 
Presidential Commission for the Advancement of 
National Defense recommended that a single com-
mander have authority over all military services’ 
combat assets. Prior to the Cheonan attack, the Min-
istry of National Defense had limited its plans for 
improving military joint operational capabilities to 
changes in the procurement system, not operational 
reforms.14
After the attacks, South Korea shifted the main 
priority of its defense planning. Rather than prepar-
ing for a large-scale invasion and total war, Seoul 
focused on flexible, customized responses to local-
ized military attacks. For example, defense planners 
placed greater emphasis on the navy and air force’s 
role in retaliating against North Korean infiltrations 
and tactical provocations, particularly in the West 
Sea.
This shift marks a reversal from earlier assess-
ments that predicted North Korea’s conventional 
force threat would decrease, allowing Seoul to 
prioritize its navy and air force for missions away 
from the Korean Peninsula. Following the Cheon-
an attack, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Kim 
Sung-chan redirected the navy’s focus away from 
a decade-long emphasis on blue-water operations 
toward increased readiness against North Korean 
attacks. The navy increased procurement for anti-
submarine warfare, including minesweepers, anti-
submarine helicopters, and sensor systems.15 To 
emphasis this shift, the naval chief of staff even 
banned the use of “blue-water navy” and “cutting-
edge maritime force” as descriptors for the navy’s 
missions.16
While DRP 2020 was focused primarily on 
future North Korean threats, the two attacks in 
2010 prompted the Lee administration to redirect 
defense reform toward near-term security initiatives. 
Although DR 307 has mid- and long-term elements, 
Seoul will now be focused on enhancing military 
readiness against imminent North Korean asym-
metric threats. Defense Minister Kim explained that 
the aim of DR 307 was to “proactively deter cur-
rent threats posed by the enemy rather than cope 
with potential threats in the future.” Kim added that 
with DR 307, “it will take one or two days for our 
military to destroy North Korea’s long-range artil-
lery pieces, from the current one week.”17
Parameters of DR 307
The Ministry of Defense announced that DR 
30718 contained several changes in the Korean 
military command structure, unit structure, troop 
structure, and force structure. Specifically, DR 307 
called for:
•	 Command structure reform. This reform cre-
ates an efficient military command system to take 
the initiative in war planning, preparing for the-
ater operations after wartime OPCON transition, 
and establishing a new combined defense system 
for South Korean–U.S. combined operations.
14. “The Korean Peninsula: Rising Military Tensions and the ROK’s Changing Foreign and Defense Policy,” chap. 3, in 
National Institute for Defense Studies (Japan), East Asian Strategic Review 2011, May 2011, p.101,  
at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2011/east-asian_e2011_03.pdf (October 12, 2011).
15. Jung Sunk-ki, “Navy to Focus on Littoral Warfare,” Korea Times, September 15, 2010,  
at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/09/205_73102.html (October 12, 2011).
16. Editorial, “Changing Course?” The Korea Herald, September 24, 2010.
17. Yonhap News, “Defense Chief Unveils Plans to Reform Military, Enhance Interoperability,” March 8, 2011, at http://english.
yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/08/69/0301000000AEN20110308011300315F.HTML (October 12, 2011).
18. Any assessment of the DR 307 must be preliminary since many details have yet to be disclosed. This lack of disclosure 
is partly due to the fact that the plan is still evolving and remains very much a work in progress. As such, it may be 
amended as the government continues to solicit input from within and outside of the military. The plan may also change 
as legislation is debated within the National Assembly.
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•	 Unit structure reform. This reform reduces 
the number of units and streamlines the mid-
tier command elements by augmenting combat 
capabilities of combat troop organizations.
•	 Troop structure reform. This reform shifts the 
military command toward a technology-inten-
sive structure supported mainly by officers and 
NCOs—an attempt to address the current dearth 
of skilled soldiers.
•	 Force structure reform. This reform prepares 
the South Korean army to confront current and 
future North Korean threats by reinforcing joint-
ness of forces19 and procuring necessary war 
capabilities.20
Improving Military Service Jointness. DR 307 
improves interoperability and combat effectiveness 
of South Korea’s armed forces by restructuring the 
top military command structure and better inte-
grating the different service branches. The South 
Korean joint chiefs of staff have been strengthened 
so that the chairman will now command all opera-
tions during war and peacetime following wartime 
OPCON transition.
The chairman, JCS will function as the theater 
operational commander with limited administra-
tive authority (personnel, logistics, training) over 
the military services. The chairman will have two 
subordinate vice chairmen—a four-star supporting 
operational command and a three-star overseeing 
operational support.
Rather than concentrating only on administra-
tive tasks, the service chiefs will be put into the 
operational chain of command under the chairman, 
JCS. The operations commands of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force will be merged, and each of the three 
armed services will command the unified opera-
tions units. These changes will transform the joint 
chiefs of staff into an inter-service operational com-
mand. During wartime, the chairman, JCS would 
lead army and naval forces, while the commander 
of U.S. 7th Air Force will remain the air component 
commander.
In 2015, Seoul will streamline its ground forces 
by combining the 1st and 3rd field armies into a 
Ground Operations Command while leaving the 
2nd Operations Command (formerly 2nd ROK 
Army) as is. DR 307 also mandates enhancing early 
warning and real-time battlefield surveillance and 
reconnaissance capabilities both on the Korean 
Peninsula and in the surrounding areas. To have 
the capacity to fulfill this mandate, South Korea will 
need to boost its network-centric warfare capabili-
ties by establishing a command, control, communi-
cations, computer and intelligence C4I system and 
battlefield network in order to secure its capacity for 
integrated combat.21
Defending Against North Korean Incursions. 
To boost defenses of the northwest border islands, 
Seoul will augment military forces and sensors in 
the area, increase alliance naval and combined-arms 
exercises in the West Sea, and establish a joint com-
mand headquarters.22 DR 307 reverses DRP 2020’s 
planned reduction of 4,000 Marines and instead 
augments the Korean Marine Corps by 2,000 to 
4,000 additional Marines. Seoul will address long-
standing logistical shortcomings by purchasing 40 
more helicopters for the Marine Corps as well as 
additional amphibious ships and light-armored 
vehicles. Furthermore, in addition to accelerating 
the procurement of high-altitude spy drones, South 
Korea will secure advanced counter-battery radar 
systems and precision-guided munitions capable of 
attacking North Korean artillery systems.
The new Northwest Islands Defense Command 
will be a division-sized unit initially commanded by 
Marine Commandant Lieutenant General Yoo Nak-
jun. The new command will have authority not only 
over ground forces on the five islands, but also over 
naval and air forces units. This command could 
serve as a model for additional joint commands.
19. Jointness is cooperation or integration between military services to enhance combat effectiveness.
20. Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, May 5, 2011, p. 136,  
at http://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_file/info/mndpaper/2010/2010WhitePaperAll_eng.pdf (October 12, 2011).
21. Ibid., p. 144.
22. Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, “Defense Ministry Unveils New Defense Reform.”
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The command was envisioned as a Northwest 
Command with broader authority. However, the 
South Korean Navy’s resistance to the plan resulted 
in a narrowing of the command’s scope by adding 
“island” to the title and restricting the authority to 
two kilometers from the islands. As a result, the 
command encapsulates the good and bad of South 
Korean defense reform: It is an effective initiative, 
but the process suffered from service parochialism 
and a “don’t break my rice bowl” mentality. In the 
future, Seoul should not allow parochial concerns 
to supersede national security interests.
After the command became operational in mid-
2011, the geographic limit was removed and the 
commandant was given greater responsibility for 10 
provocation scenarios. Although a step in the right 
direction, it appears there is still confusion within 
the South Korean defense establishment over the 
rules of engagement and delineation of responsibili-
ties among commanders.
DR 307 Improves South Korean  
Combat Capabilities
DR 307 lays a strong foundation for South 
Korea’s planned transfer of wartime OPCON in 
2015. Seoul should be commended for creating, for 
the first time, an organizational structure capable of 
assuming independent military command while the 
United States serves in a supporting role. The plan 
will enable South Korea to develop a more flexible 
and joint military force. By redressing the divided 
military command and administrative structure, 
Seoul will be able to exercise more effective joint 
command.
Currently, the deputy commander of Combined 
Forces Command serves as the ground component 
commander (GCC); the commander of the U.S. 7th 
Fleet serves as the naval component commander; 
and the commander of the U.S. 7th Air Force serves 
as the air component commander (ACC). After 
OPCON transfer, the ROK army and navy chiefs of 
staff will serve as GCC and NCC, respectively. The 
commander of the U.S. 7th Air Force will remain 
as ACC.
South Korea is also putting into place programs 
to enhance its own strategic surveillance capabili-
ties, thereby reducing its reliance on U.S. systems. 
If implemented, this would enable Seoul to improve 
its C4I significantly by deploying several systems:
•	 Korea Joint Command and Control System 
(KJCCS) to connect the JCS to each service;
•	 Military Information Management System 
(MIMS) to enable tactical-level cross-service 
interoperability;
•	 Joint Tactical Data Link System (JTDLS) to allow 
dissemination of digitalized tactical information 
between all services; and
•	 Tactical Information Communication Net-
work (TICN) providing real-time broadband 
communications.23
Revised Plan Still Faces Challenges
Strategic Improvements but Tactical Deficien-
cies. Without question, DR 307 will improve South 
Korea’s ability to prevail in a major war against 
North Korea. However, DR 307 does not provide 
South Korea with the agility or military efficiency 
to respond to Pyongyang’s tactical provocations. 
Furthermore, senior U.S. military officials have pri-
vately commented that South Korean forces are not 
currently organized for joint operations, particular-
ly at the tactical level.
The South Korean military’s tactical deficien-
cies are primarily the result of insufficient inter-
connectivity between the various service branches. 
The military also lacks necessary tactical C4ISR and 
training to conduct cross-service operations. The 
Combined Forces Command (CFC), which will 
cease after the transfer of wartime OPCON author-
ity in 2015, provides cross-integration and joint-
ness at subordinate levels. All South Korean units 
are tied into the CFC, which serves as the overall 
coordinating body for Seoul’s military.
23. Major Fred L. Huh, “Azimuth Check: An Analysis of Military Transformation in the Republic of Korea—Is It Sufficient?” 
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Military Command and General Staff College, March 12, 2009,  
at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522032&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (October 12, 2011).
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With cessation of the CFC looming, South Korea 
needs to put into place agile command and con-
trol structures that enable the rapid application of 
appropriate joint military power at the tactical level 
with control at the operational or even strategic 
level. DR 307 does not fulfill this requirement—an 
oversight that must be addressed in the near future.
Still Requires Essential Funding. For all its 
improvements over earlier defense reform plans, DR 
307 still faces the same demographic and budget 
challenges. Like its predecessors, DR 307 remains 
reliant on government funding for required defense 
resources.
If fully funded, DR 307 will improve South Korea’s 
military capabilities by altering the force structure 
and augmenting the combat power of units. The 
plan would compensate for decreased troop levels 
by increasing qualitative capabilities. In the past, 
South Korea has often purchased “shiny baubles” 
(high-tech weapons) without also acquiring neces-
sary logistics, sustainment, training, C4ISR enables, 
and integration capabilities. Seoul must ensure that 
it does not repeat the same mistake as it moves for-
ward with funding DR 307.
Avoiding such mistakes, however, also requires 
carrying through on promised upgrades in weapons 
and equipment. Unfortunately, there is no indica-
tion to date that DR 307 is any more likely to be 
fully funded than DRP 2020 was.
What the ROK Should Do
•	 Fully fund defense requirements. Budget 
shortfalls have always undermined attempts to 
reform South Korea’s military. For any defense 
reform initiatives to take hold, Seoul must 
ensure legislative approval of necessary laws and 
sufficient budgetary resources. Furthermore, 
entrenched defense interests will work to derail 
these reforms; overcoming such resistance will 
require direct involvement from both the presi-
dent and the minister of defense.
The new defense reform plan should be imple-
mented without delay to ensure a strong national 
security posture. If Seoul does not fully fund DR 
307, it should reduce the pace of force reductions.
•	 Procure proper equipment. As the South Kore-
an military continues to modernize, it must pro-
cure the right equipment, weapons, and force 
mix to provide strong deterrent and combat 
capabilities. Seoul should acquire:
1. Improved command, control, communica-
tion, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities to enable integrat-
ed combat capabilities down to tactical level. 
This improvement requires sensors such as 
AWACs and high-altitude UAVs as well as 
integrating command and communication 
systems.
2. Enhanced long-range precision-strike capa-
bilities, including fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft, attack helicopters, precision-guided 
munitions, extended-range surface-to-surface 
missiles, and counter-battery radar and artil-
lery systems.
3. Target-location and target-designation equip-
ment for ground tactical teams’ control of aer-
ial delivered precision-guided munitions.
4. Increased sealift and airlift for the Marine 
Corps by purchasing more amphibious ships, 
transport helicopters, and light armored 
vehicles.
5. Flexible systems to fulfill multiple missions 
and enhance interoperability among services. 
For example, the Dokdo helicopter trans-
port ship improves sealift, enables Marine 
amphibious assaults against North Korea, 
and supports overseas HADR (Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Response) and peace-
keeping missions.
In addition, Seoul should adopt the “whole pack-
age” concept when purchasing new combat systems 
by including funding for maintenance, supply, and 
training to prevent logistic shortfalls.
•	 Create a joint task force headquarters for cri-
sis response. In order to conduct smaller-scale 
strike missions, the ROK should establish, equip, 
and train a standing joint task force headquar-
ters directly subordinate to C/JCS. Similar to a 
U.S. Joint Task Force, there would not be a large 
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number of units assigned to the headquarters. 
Instead, varying units would be assigned tempo-
rarily to the headquarters to conduct training for 
limited attack scenarios.
Developing a clearly defined unified command 
structure would enable Seoul to synchronize 
selected combat power from all of South Korea’s 
military services. In doing so, the South Kore-
an military could conduct limited but powerful 
retaliatory strike missions in response to North 
Korean military provocations and aggression.
•	 Expand the South Korean Marine Corps. The 
first step in any such expansion would be to 
fulfill the presidential task force’s recommenda-
tion to add 4,000 Marines to the Marine Corps. 
Expanding the ROK Marine Corps would have 
several important benefits: It would enhance 
any defense of the northwest islands; it would 
increase full-spectrum attack capabilities against 
the North; and it would support Seoul’s “Global 
Korea” strategy by permitting greater off-penin-
sula participation in U.N. peacekeeping opera-
tions and other international security missions.
•	 Improve the reserve mobilization system. 
Currently, all ROK reserve military units are 
mobilized at Defcon 2; a more tailored mobi-
lization structure could allow some units to be 
mobilized at Defcon 3. Also, the ROK should 
improve reserve training to ensure that it is able 
to respond to North Korean rear area attacks or 
regime collapse.
•	 Deploy a multilayered missile defense sys-
tem. Such a system should be interoperable with 
a U.S. regional missile network to provide for 
a more coherent and effective defense of allied 
military facilities and the South Korean popu-
lace. This system would include purchasing and 
deploying PAC-3 ground-based missiles and 
SM-3 missiles and augmenting missile defense 
planning and exercises with the U.S. and Japan.
What the U.S. Should Do
Although defense reform is an internal South 
Korean issue, America’s national interests remain at 
stake, as any reforms affect the alliance’s capabili-
ties against the multi-faceted North Korean military 
threat. It is therefore important for the United States 
to remain fully engaged in the evolution and imple-
mentation of DR 307.
•	 The U.S. Congress and the South Korean 
National Assembly should hold public hear-
ings regarding peninsular security issues. 
These hearings should address what steps need 
to be taken to ensure that the alliance is still able 
to deter, defend, and defeat any North Korean 
aggression. Maintaining transparency between 
the allies and the populaces of both South Korea 
and the United States is necessary to secure strong 
public support for defense reform initiatives and 
U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula.
These hearings should also provide a threat 
assessment of North Korea’s military; the roles, 
missions, and capabilities of South Korean forces; 
their relationship with U.S. forces both pre- and 
post-transfer of wartime OPCON; and requisite 
funding levels. Both countries should deter-
mine necessary defense funding levels, identify 
any potential shortfalls, and review the plans to 
redress them.
•	 Washington should accept South Korea’s 
request to extend its ballistic missile range. As 
South Korea prepares to assume greater respon-
sibility for its own defense, it makes sense for 
Seoul to be able to hold all North Korean targets 
at risk. Currently, Seoul’s surface-to-surface bal-
listic missiles are limited to a range of 300 kilo-
meters; this should be extended to 1,000 km. 
Washington’s agreement to the range extension 
should come in return for greater South Korean 
participation in a comprehensive allied missile 
defense system.
•	 Washington must maintain a robust forward-
deployed military presence in South Korea. 
Such a presence is necessary to defend a criti-
cal ally and maintain peace in Northeast Asia. 
The Obama Administration should therefore 
emphasize its commitment both to maintaining 
U.S. forces at the promised 28,500 troop level 
and to augmenting those forces during a crisis in 
order to deter, defend against, and defeat secu-
rity threats to the region.
Washington should also affirm its unequivocal 
commitment to defending South Korea by main-
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taining the threefold U.S. promise of extended 
deterrence composed of conventional forces, 
missile defense, and the nuclear umbrella.
•	 Congress should fully fund ongoing U.S. mil-
itary realignment plans in South Korea and 
Japan. These plans include the Yongsan base 
relocation, land partnership plan, and family 
housing for accompanied tours. Proposed cuts 
by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee would undermine years of carefully crafted 
diplomacy that achieved U.S. strategic objectives 
and resolved contentious issues with allies.
Potential additional $500 billion cuts in the 
defense budget would have a devastating impact 
on U.S. ability to deter security threats in Asia, 
protect American national interests, and fulfill 
our defense treaty obligations to critical allies in 
the region.
•	 The United States should augment deploy-
ments and training exercises in South 
Korea by:
1. Increasing training deployments of the 31st 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (stationed on Oki-
nawa) to South Korea to facilitate improve-
ment of South Korean Marine capabilities 
as part of DR 307 and Northwest Island 
Command;
2. Demonstrating that the strategic flexibility 
strategy24 also works to South Korea’s advan-
tage by including U.S. combat units deployed 
from the United States and U.S. forward bases 
in Asia in future training exercises on the 
Korean Peninsula;
3. Increasing the scope and frequency of naval 
exercises, including U.S. carriers, particularly 
in the West Sea;
4. Returning an Army attack helicopter battalion 
to South Korea; and 
5. Forward deploying an additional U.S. Air 
Force combat fighter squadron to South 
Korea.25
A Critical Journey Begins
South Korea has begun a necessary though diffi-
cult journey to modernize its military structure and 
implement a more effective command structure. For 
this, America’s ally should be strongly commended. 
The benefits of such reform are impressive: DR 307 
will enable South Korea to assume the mantle of 
wartime operational control in 2015 more effective-
ly. The defense reform plan also improves Seoul’s 
ability to conduct large-scale military operations in 
response to a North Korean invasion.
Yet questions remain about Seoul’s ability to 
respond to North Korean limited attacks and prov-
ocations, such as those against the Cheonan and 
Yeonpyeong Island. Washington should work with 
its ally to ensure that South Korea can respond to 
any future attack. At the same time, however, the 
United States should ensure that any response is 
proportional and confined to the area of attack in 
order to prevent a tactical confrontation from esca-
lating to an all-out conflict.
While North Korean threats will remain the par-
amount focus of the U.S.–South Korean alliance, 
neither country should lose sight of the benefits of 
Seoul’s “going global” with its political, economic, 
and military capabilities. The Joint Vision for the 
Alliance announced by Presidents Obama and Lee 
in June 2009 called for building a comprehensive 
strategic alliance that addressed not only bilateral 
concerns, but regional and global issues as well.26
24. Under the strategic flexibility strategy, U.S. forces in South Korea could deploy off peninsula to respond to other crises. 
Seoul has worried that any redeployment could become permanent, resulting in a reduced U.S. military presence and 
perceived reduction in the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea.
25. General B.B. Bell, “What Must Be Done About North Korea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Office of 
the Korea Chair, December 14, 2010, at http://csis.org/files/publication/101214_What_must_be_done_about_North_Korea_
Platform.pdf (October 12, 2011).
26. The White House, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” June 16, 
2009, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-
Republic-of-Korea (October 12, 2011).
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South Korea’s military has played a useful role 
in previous multinational efforts against common 
security threats in Asia and worldwide. Given its 
increased fears of the North Korean threat, the ROK 
populace may not support overseas peacekeeping 
missions. Yet such missions can provide indirect 
planning and training for North Korean collapse 
scenarios.
Seoul should be encouraged to assume a greater 
role on the world stage that is commensurate with 
its growing capabilities. South Korea serves as a 
shining example of how a small nation can bene-
fit from the international community. In turn, this 
“miracle on the Han River” can now reach out to 
assist other nations.
—Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for 
Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heri-
tage Foundation.
